Description
Every school and college in England and Wales carries a legal duty to have regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. That duty sits in section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and it is the reason this course exists. It is also the reason a great many staff in schools find the subject uncomfortable, because the word terrorism sits next to a set of school processes they already know well, and the two are easily confused with each other.
This course is Prevent Duty Awareness. It is built from the Prevent duty guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales, the statutory guidance the Home Office published in December 2023, and from the Prevent section of Keeping Children Safe in Education 2026. It covers the legal basis, the three definitions that matter, what susceptibility actually looks like, how a referral works, what Channel is, and the two things the duty asks of a school that people rarely expect: building resilience through the curriculum, and reducing the permissive environments that make radicalisation easier.
It also covers what you are not required to do. That is deliberate, because most of the harm that comes from misunderstanding the Prevent duty comes from thinking it requires more of people than it does. The guidance is explicit that the duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority, and it is explicit that a concern which points to a different kind of support should be dealt with as a different kind of support.
Every definition and every quotation on this page is taken from the source documents, with the paragraph or page it came from. The legal wording is from section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and Schedule 6 of the same Act, which lists the authorities the duty applies to. The terrorism definition is from the Terrorism Act 2000. The guidance itself is on the GOV.UK Prevent duty guidance page, and the Department for Education’s own advice for settings is on Managing the risk of radicalisation in your education setting.
What This Course Covers
The Prevent duty gets taught badly in a lot of settings, and the usual reason is that it gets taught as a set of definitions with a referral form at the end. This course goes in the other order. It starts with what the law requires, because the law is narrower and more reassuring than most people assume, and it works outwards from there to the things that are actually hard: reading a change in behaviour without over-reading it, drawing a line between a safeguarding concern and a Prevent referral, and understanding that the duty asks something of the curriculum and of the way a setting handles speakers and events, not only of a single worried member of staff.
So the course covers the duty itself: what section 26 says, which settings it binds, what due regard means in law as against what it means in the guidance, and the three objectives that sit behind the whole Prevent framework. It covers the definitions of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, because all three appear in the statutory guidance and they are routinely used as if they were interchangeable when they are not.
It covers the referral route in the terms the guidance uses, which is notice, check, share, and it follows the referral through to a gateway assessment and a possible Channel panel. It covers Channel in enough detail for a member of staff to understand what it is, who it involves, why consent matters, and why a Channel referral is not a sentence. It covers the parts of the duty that are about the setting rather than about the child: building resilience through the curriculum, and reducing permissive environments including the management of external speakers and events.
And it covers the boundaries. What the Prevent duty does not require, what a referral does not do, what staff should never attempt on their own, and where the ordinary safeguarding route should be used instead.
Who It’s For
Every setting that is a specified authority in Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 has the duty, and the guidance lists them precisely. For schools, that is the proprietors of maintained schools, non-maintained special schools, maintained nursery schools, independent schools including academies and free schools, and alternative provision academies; 16 to 19 academies; the management committees of Pupil Referral Units; registered early years childcare settings; registered later years childcare settings; and providers of holiday schemes for disabled children. Further education institutions are covered as a separate group, which is dealt with in a later part of the guidance.
Within a school, the duty does not fall on a handful of people. The guidance is clear that education settings should make sure that relevant staff have training that could help them prevent learners from being radicalised into terrorism, and that it should be delivered at the earliest opportunity to ensure staff are adequately equipped for their role. It then sets out who that should be, and it is wider than the Prevent lead: it includes staff who interact most frequently with learners, those responsible for overseeing adherence with the Prevent duty, and those with specific functions to undertake, such as those who manage external speakers and events.
So this course is for teachers and teaching assistants, for the people who run the breakfast club and the after-school provision, for those who book and host visitors and external speakers, for those who manage the filtering and monitoring systems, for the designated safeguarding lead and the Prevent lead, and for anyone who might find themselves the member of staff a child tells something to. It is also for anyone who might find themselves being asked to justify, or to refuse, a booking.
There is one group it is specifically not for, in the sense that the training requirement is different. The guidance says the Designated Safeguarding Lead or Prevent lead in the setting should receive more in-depth training, and it also sets out that further education and higher education institutions should be especially mindful of their duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom. If you work in a further education setting, this course still applies to you, but the surrounding duties are slightly different and the guidance treats them separately.
The Duty: What Section 26 Actually Says
The statutory wording is short, and it is worth reading in full before reading anything written about it.
Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, headed General duty on specified authorities, says: a specified authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. It then defines a specified authority as a person or body that is listed in Schedule 6, and notes that where a specified authority is listed in terms that refer to the exercise of particular functions or to a particular capacity, the reference to its functions is to those functions or its functions when acting in that capacity. Subsection 4 sets out exceptions, including judicial functions.
Three things follow from that wording that are worth holding on to.
First, it is a duty about functions, not about people. A school discharges the Prevent duty through the things it already does: its curriculum, its safeguarding arrangements, its management of visitors, its handling of complaints, its filtering and monitoring. There is no separate activity that is the duty.
Second, the duty is a duty to have regard, not a duty to achieve an outcome. The guidance explains what due regard means in practice, and the definition is worth quoting because it is the difference between the statutory duty and the public misunderstanding of it. The guidance says that the Prevent duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority, and that the term due regard as used in the Act means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions.
That is the whole legal test. Place an appropriate amount of weight on it, alongside everything else you have to consider, and you have complied. It is not a prohibition, it is not a direction to exclude anybody from anything, and it is not a licence to act differently for people who hold different views.
Third, note the difference in wording between the statute and the guidance. The Act says the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The guidance says becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. They are not identical formulations and the guidance is not simply quoting the section. That matters more than it sounds, because it is the point at which Prevent becomes about support for a person who is at risk of being drawn in, rather than about a determination that somebody is a terrorist.
The guidance itself is statutory. It is issued by the Home Office under section 29 of the same Act, and the current edition came into force on 31 December 2023, replacing the 2015 guidance and the separate further education and higher education editions. It uses must and should throughout, with must for what the specified authority is legally required to do and should for the expectations and good practice that come with complying.
What Prevent Is, and What It Is Not
Prevent has three objectives, and the guidance states them plainly: to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism; to intervene early to support people susceptible to radicalisation; and to enable people who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate.
Read those three objectives in order and the shape of Prevent becomes clear. The first is about the environment, and it is the objective that sits closest to a school’s curriculum, its community and its partnerships. The second is about the individual, and it is the objective that produces referrals, Channel and the early intervention work. The third is about people who have already been through the criminal justice system, and it is the least visible from a school.
The delivery model is built around those three. On the ideological causes, the guidance says Prevent focuses on reducing the influence of radicalisers on susceptible audiences, as well as reducing the availability of, and access to, terrorist content, and it works in partnership with local, regional and national partners, law enforcement agencies and other government partners to disrupt radicalisers, including those who sow division and hatred.
Two further points from the guidance are worth having, because they explain why Prevent is a duty that lands differently on different settings. The guidance acknowledges that how the duty is done in practice will vary depending on factors such as the local context and risk, the most appropriate type of Prevent activity to be involved in, and the nature of the primary responsibilities and functions of the authority. And it says that for those who work directly with people who may be susceptible to radicalisation, activity is most likely to be around identification and early intervention, with relevant factors including the relationships held with the person and the frequency of interaction.
That second point is the honest explanation of why the duty feels bigger in some schools than others. It is not a judgement about the staff. It is a statement about who they see and how often.
What Prevent is not is worth stating as well. It is not a test of political opinion. It is not a list of opinions that are banned in a school. It is not a reporting duty triggered by disagreement with a speaker, a parent, a pupil or a colleague. And it is not, in the words of the guidance, something that should limit discussion of these issues, because education settings should be spaces in which people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including, where appropriate, terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge those ideas.
The Three Definitions That Matter
Three words carry the whole framework, and they are used loosely enough in everyday conversation to stop meaning anything. These are the definitions the guidance uses.
Extremism
Extremism is the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs. That wording is from the glossary in Annex A of Keeping Children Safe in Education 2026, on page 170. The glossary in Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026 gives a slightly different version of the same definition on page 163, and adds a limb this course does not cover: calls for the death of members of our armed forces.
Two features of that definition are easy to miss. It is vocal or active opposition, so the test includes speech and conduct, and it is opposition to values rather than to a person, a faith or a community. A pupil who disagrees with the rule of law has not thereby become an extremist, and a pupil who is vocally hostile to people of a different faith has, on the face of it, met the definition.
Radicalisation
Radicalisation is the process of a person legitimising support for, or use of, terrorist violence. The guidance adds that most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause, which is a sentence that ought to be read carefully, because it says two things at once: that this is a process people move through, and that the process is not simply the result of manipulation.
The keyword is legitimising. It is not the same as holding an opinion, or sharing an opinion, or researching an opinion. It is the point at which a person comes to regard terrorist violence as a legitimate answer to something.
Terrorism
Terrorism is an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person or people, causes serious damage to property, or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public, and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. That definition is the one in the Terrorism Act 2000, and Keeping Children Safe in Education 2026 reproduces it for schools.
It is worth noticing what the definition does and does not include. It does not include the identity or beliefs of the person. It does not include the existence of an extremist opinion on its own. It does not include speech that is not connected to action of the kind described. The whole of Prevent sits between the second and the third of those definitions, and the referral system exists because a person can be moving from holding an opinion to being willing to use violence without anybody noticing the moment it happens.
What Susceptibility Actually Looks Like
What the guidance says
The guidance is careful here, and the care it takes is the message. There is no single profile of a radicalised person, nor is there a single pathway or conveyor belt to being radicalised. There are many factors which can, either alone or combined, lead someone to subscribe to terrorist or terrorism-supporting ideology. These factors often include exposure to radicalising influences, real and perceived grievances, often created or exacerbated through grievance narratives espoused by extremists, and a person’s own susceptibility.
So susceptibility is a combination of three things: what a person is exposed to, what they are already carrying, and the narratives in the environment that make an ideology feel like a response to something. That is why there is no checklist, and it is also why the guidance puts so much weight on the person who knows the child and can see change over time.
On behaviour, Keeping Children Safe in Education 2026 says it plainly: as with other safeguarding risks, staff should be alert to changes in children’s behaviour, which could indicate that they may be in need of help or protection, and staff should use their judgement in identifying children who might be at risk of radicalisation and act proportionately, which may include the designated safeguarding lead or a deputy making a Prevent referral.
Three specific trends from the guidance are worth knowing because they are the ones that actually show up in a school. First, the guidance records that online radicalisation has become the predominant pathway for an increasing proportion of terrorism-related offenders in England and Wales, where previously it was a hybrid of online and offline influences, and that this can involve people, including a concerning number of children under the age of 18, committing offences by downloading and disseminating terrorist materials. Second, it notes that conspiracy theories can act as gateways to radicalised thinking and sometimes violence. Third, it observes that the majority of related activity in the UK has consisted of lawful protest, and that where this has involved violence it has resulted in offences relating to public order, which is a useful corrective to the idea that every unpopular opinion on a political issue is on a path to terrorism.
There is one more point in the education section of the guidance that changes what staff are looking for, and it is easy to miss. Settings should not only be alert to violent extremism but also to non-violent extremism, including certain divisive or intolerant narratives which can reasonably be linked to terrorism. A school that is only watching for physical preparation for violence will miss most of what it needs to see.
What staff are not expected to do
This is the part that gets left out. The guidance does not ask ordinary staff to assess whether somebody is radicalised. It asks them to notice a change, form a view based on what they know, and pass it to someone who can assess it.
Three safeguards sit around that. The first is proportionality. The guidance says that specified authorities should ensure any decisions taken are proportionate to the risk of terrorism and radicalisation in their local area, sector or institution, and that for practitioners it is key to be mindful of the need for proportionality, that a risk-based approach should always be followed using professional judgement and curiosity, and that there should be one consistent and proportionate threshold applied to Prevent activity across all extremist ideologies and radicalisation concerns. One threshold, applied the same way to every ideology, is what stops Prevent becoming a tool for deciding whose views are tolerable.
The second is the threshold for referring at all. The guidance says that when determining whether a concern meets the threshold for referral to Prevent, it is important to consider the harm posed to the person, as well as whether accessing support through Prevent might stop potential wider societal harm committed by the person. Both limbs. The first is about the individual, and the second is about the rest of society, and a referral can be made on either basis.
The third is the escape route, and it is the one staff most need to know about. The guidance says that if you are unsure whether a concern constitutes a Prevent referral, we encourage seeking advice from your DSL or equivalent, local authority Prevent lead or police, in the first instance. And it goes further: consideration should also be given to whether the person may be susceptible to radicalisation or may instead be more suitable for a different type of support or safeguarding referral.
That last sentence matters more than any other in this section. A child who is being groomed, exploited, bullied into an extremist group, or simply in crisis is not a Prevent referral, and treating them as one does them a disservice. Most children whose views worry staff are better served by the safeguarding route, by pastoral support, or by their family, and the guidance expects staff to be able to tell the difference and to ask.
Notice, Check, Share: How a Referral Works
When a concern is identified, the procedure to apply is notice, check, share, and it is described in the Home Office Prevent duty awareness course. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training service is available at no cost and provides courses covering Prevent awareness, the referral process, Channel and a refresher awareness course, so a member of staff can work through the actual procedure rather than a summary of it.
Notice is the stage where a member of staff sees a change in behaviour, a piece of content, a conversation or a disclosure and recognises it as worth a second look. What they are not doing at this stage is deciding it is terrorism.
Check is the stage where the concern is checked, which in practice means it is escalated. The guidance says that often the concern will be escalated to the organisation or institution’s Designated Safeguarding Lead or Prevent lead to check. That is the internal check, and the setting’s DSL or Prevent lead should be aware of local procedures for making a Prevent referral. If a member of staff is uncertain, the guidance is explicit that they should seek advice from the DSL or equivalent, the local authority Prevent lead or the police in the first instance.
Share is the stage where the referral is made, using the Prevent national referral form. The guidance requires settings to have a clear policy on their approach for submitting a Prevent referral, including use of the Prevent national referral form, and to consider the process for how learners or staff raise concerns regarding radicalisation internally. A setting that has not decided who signs the form and how it gets sent has a duty it cannot discharge, so this is one of the things worth checking at the start of the year rather than in the middle of an incident.
What happens next is not the school’s decision. Once a referral is submitted to Prevent, it is assessed by specialist police officers and staff. Those officers determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism and should therefore be considered by the Channel panel for support through Prevent. The guidance calls this a gateway assessment, and it adds that if other support mechanisms are simultaneously required or being considered, these should proceed unless there is a good reason not to do so.
That last point is the one to hold on to if you are ever in a situation where a Prevent referral is being considered. A Prevent referral is not a substitute for the safeguarding support a child needs, and the guidance says the other support should carry on in parallel.
The gateway assessment itself is run on frameworks, and the guidance lists what those frameworks consider: determining the presence of an ideological driver, determining what harm may be caused by the person or could be caused to the person being referred, and considering factors such as a person’s agency, as well as any predisposition to exploitation. The reasoning behind the consistency point is given too, in that those making the assessment use a combination of frameworks, guidance and professional judgement to ensure there is no disparity in the threshold for making a referral dependent on ideology.
Channel: What It Is and What It Is Not
How Channel works
Channel is a voluntary, confidential support programme which focuses on providing support at an early stage to people who are identified as being susceptible to being drawn into terrorism. Prevent referrals are first assessed by police and may be passed to a multi-agency Channel panel, which discusses the individual referred to determine whether they are at risk of being drawn into terrorism and consider the appropriate support required.
The panel is chaired by the local authority and attended by multi-agency partners such as police, education professionals, health services, housing and social services. A representative from the school or college may be asked to attend the Channel panel to help with the assessment. Once accepted, the panel agrees a tailored package of support to be offered to the person.
There are four features of that description that matter operationally.
The first is that Channel is voluntary, and the guidance is specific about consent. An individual is required to provide their consent before any support delivered through the programme is provided, and in cases where the person is under 18 years of age, consent is provided by a parent, guardian or the agency that has responsibility for their care. So for a child in your school, the consent decision is not the child’s alone and is not the school’s either.
The second is that Channel is early. It is not an investigation and it is not a prosecution. It exists because a person who is susceptible to being drawn into terrorism can be supported out of that path if somebody acts while the path is still a path rather than a history.
The third is that the risk is kept under review where Channel cannot manage it. The guidance says that where risks cannot be managed in Channel, they will be kept under review by the police. That is the safety valve, and it exists so that no one is ever quietly parked in a support programme that is not working.
The fourth is that the school has responsibilities around Channel that sit outside the referral itself. The guidance asks that settings consider whether it would be appropriate to share information with a new school or college in advance of a child leaving, for example information that would allow the new setting to continue supporting a child who has been victims of abuse, or details of those who are currently receiving support through the Channel programme and have that support in place for when the child arrives. There is separate statutory guidance on Channel panels, and the Home Office publishes training for people who may be asked to contribute to or sit on one.
What Channel is not
Channel is not a register, a label, or a list. It is not a police investigation and it does not produce a criminal record. It is not something a child is put on because of what they said in an assembly or wrote in a lesson. And it is not a substitute for a safeguarding referral, because the guidance says that if other support mechanisms are simultaneously required or being considered, those should proceed unless there is a good reason not to do so.
Two misconceptions are worth naming directly because they come up in staff rooms. The first is that Channel is a punishment. It is not, and describing it to a family as anything other than support will make the process much harder for everyone. The second is that a Channel referral is a permanent state. It is a package of support with an end point, and where the risk cannot be managed within it, the police keep it under review rather than closing it.
Building Resilience in the Curriculum
This is the half of the Prevent duty that most settings forget, and the guidance is quite clear that it is not optional. Schools and further education settings support learners to have the knowledge, skills and values that will prepare them to be citizens in modern Britain, and in England they are required to actively promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.
The guidance then connects it to the purpose. By promoting these shared values, settings can help build resilience to radicalisation and extremism. It gives examples: providing a safe environment for debating controversial issues, and helping learners understand how they can influence and participate in decision making.
For schools, the guidance identifies specific opportunities in the curriculum, such as Citizenship and Relationships and Sex and Health Education. It notes learning around building positive relationships and the importance of respecting difference, and it mentions the United Nations Rights Respecting Schools Programme as an example of building resilience through a school’s ethos and the ways in which it organises itself.
What the guidance does not ask for is a lesson called radicalisation, and it says so. It says that the Prevent duty does not mean it should limit discussion of these issues, and that settings should be spaces in which people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including, where appropriate, terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas. When doing so, settings should encourage learners to respect other people, with particular regard to the protected characteristics set out in the Equality Act 2010.
That last point is a useful corrective to a common worry. The risk to be managed here is not a learner encountering an extremist idea and believing it. It is a learner who cannot evaluate what they are being shown, who has no vocabulary for why it is wrong, and who has never been in a room where disagreement was handled without anybody being threatened. Critical thinking and respectful disagreement are the infrastructure, and they are built long before anyone needs them.
Reducing Permissive Environments
The third theme of the Prevent duty is reducing permissive environments, which is the language the guidance uses for the conditions in which radicalisation becomes easier. It is about what a setting allows to happen, not about what an individual believes.
Filtering and monitoring comes first. For schools and colleges in England, Keeping Children Safe in Education and the Department’s digital and technology standards provide advice on appropriate filtering and monitoring systems, and the UK Safer Internet Centre has published guidance on what appropriate filtering and monitoring might look like. The important point for staff who are not in IT is that the safeguarding expectation and the technical expectation are the same expectation: a child in a school should not be able to reach terrorist material, and the school has to be able to show how it prevents that. Government analysis has found that online radicalisation became the predominant pathway for an increasing proportion of terrorism-related offenders, so this is not a theoretical control.
External speakers and events come second, and this is where individual members of staff carry a specific responsibility. The guidance says settings should consider the extent to which any external speakers and events held on their premises pose a risk of radicalising learners into terrorism, and that when deciding whether to host a particular speaker, settings should consider carefully whether the views being expressed are consistent with the school’s ethos and values, whether they are appropriate for the age and maturity of the audience, and whether they are going to be challenged appropriately if they are controversial.
The guidance is blunt about the legal floor underneath this. Encouragement of terrorism, including glorifying the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism, fundraising for the purposes of terrorism, and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, are all criminal offences, and settings should not provide a platform for these offences to be committed.
That is the sentence that should end a booking conversation, and it is the one to have in your head if you are ever asked to host someone whose content you are not sure about. The decision is not a judgement call about the views. It is a check against a list of criminal offences, and then a check against the school’s own ethos policy and risk assessment.
There is a final piece of guidance here that applies to the wider organisation rather than to a single booking. Specified authorities should carefully consider who they award Prevent funding or contracts to and ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken, and when seeking advice on the Prevent duty they should be aware that some people, groups or organisations purporting to give such advice might encourage them not to comply with the Prevent duty. The same duty of due diligence applies to training resources, where the guidance asks providers to consider whether the material they use is suitable for their context and from an authoritative source, and specifically not material that includes advice which undermines or frustrates the purposes of Prevent.
Information Sharing and the Child Protection File
Three points from the education section of the guidance deal with the record keeping, and they are the ones that most affect what happens on a child’s first day at a new school.
First, information sharing is not optional here, and the guidance connects it to existing practice rather than adding a new process. As part of their existing approach to safeguarding, settings should already have robust procedures for sharing information, both internally and externally, and information sharing is vital in promoting the welfare of learners and staff. Failure to share relevant information can affect the safety, welfare and educational outcomes of learners.
Second, consent is not the only lawful basis. The guidance says that when seeking to share personal data regarding people susceptible to radicalisation, practitioners should consider whether it is appropriate to rely on the person’s consent and must comply with the requirements of data protection legislation, and that where it is not possible to rely on consent, it is still possible to share information if there is a lawful basis for doing so. The guidance also reminds specified authorities to comply with other legal obligations, particularly data protection legislation and the Equality Act 2010, including the Public Sector Equality Duty.
Third, and most concretely, the record has to travel. It is important that when a child leaves a school or college, relevant information about engagement with Channel and the outcome of this should be securely transferred within the appropriate child protection file, which enables the new setting to have support in place in advance of a child joining. This is the point at which a setting that has done everything right can still let a child down, because the information stayed in the building.
The disclosure controls themselves come from the setting’s own policies and from the Information Commissioner’s Office, and the guidance directs settings to the ICO for their obligations.
Where Every Definition Comes From
Every definition and every quotation on this course is taken from the source documents rather than written from memory, and each one can be checked at the page or paragraph given below. The three sources are the Prevent duty guidance for England and Wales, Keeping Children Safe in Education 2026, and the glossary in Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026. Where the wording here and the wording in the source differ, the source is right and this page is wrong.
The Source Map
- The status of the guidance, the fact that it is statutory guidance issued under section 29 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and the fact that it came into force on 31 December 2023, are on page 6 of the Prevent duty guidance.
- The list of specified authorities the duty applies to, in Part 1 of Schedule 6 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, is on page 5 of the Prevent duty guidance.
- Paragraph 3, which says that the duty does not confer new functions and which defines due regard, is on page 5.
- Paragraph 15, which sets out the duty in section 26, and paragraph 17, which sets out the three objectives of Prevent, are on page 8.
- Paragraph 35, which defines radicalisation, is on page 12.
- Paragraph 43, which describes the referral to police, and paragraph 44, which sets out what anyone making a referral should ensure, are on page 13.
- Channel is described on pages 9 and 13. A referral goes to police, and the police decide whether the person is suitable to be considered by a Channel panel.
- Reducing permissive environments, and paragraph 81 on the approach to it, are on page 19.
- The education sector section of the guidance, which is the part schools and colleges should read, starts on page 33.
- The definitions of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism are in the glossary in Annex A of Keeping Children Safe in Education 2026, on page 170. The footnote to the radicalisation entry points to the Prevent duty guidance, and the footnote to the terrorism entry points to the Terrorism Act 2000.
- The entry for extremism in the glossary of Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026 is on page 163.
What This Course Does Not Cover
This course has boundaries, and knowing them is part of using it properly.
It does not make you an assessor. You are not expected to decide whether somebody is radicalised, and the guidance does not ask you to. You are asked to notice, to check with your DSL or Prevent lead, and to share where the route requires it.
It does not replace your setting’s Prevent policy. Every setting needs a clear policy on how concerns are raised internally and how a Prevent referral is submitted using the national referral form. That policy names the people, the steps and the form. This course explains the framework around it.
It does not replace the Home Office training. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training carries no charge, and it covers the referral process and the notice, check, share procedure properly. The Home Office also publishes a referral course and a Channel awareness course for people who contribute to panels.
It does not cover your local Prevent partnership. Your local authority chairs the Channel panel, runs the Prevent lead function and holds the local counter-terrorism profile. The risk in your area, the local narratives in play and the referral route are local, and the guidance is explicit that decisions should be proportionate to the risk of terrorism and radicalisation in the local area, sector or institution.
It does not cover the wider counter-terrorism picture. Pursue, Prepare and Protect are outside the Prevent duty and outside this course. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 puts duties on specified authorities in several sectors, and schools are one of them.
It is not a licence to profile. The guidance requires one consistent and proportionate threshold applied across all extremist ideologies, and a threshold that moves depending on the ideology of the person in front of you is not a threshold. If a concern is about something other than terrorism, it is a safeguarding referral and not a Prevent one, and the guidance says so directly.
What You’ll Learn
- The duty in the words of the statute. What section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 requires, what due regard means in law and as the guidance defines it, which settings and bodies are specified authorities under Schedule 6, and why the duty does not create new functions.
- What Prevent is for. The three objectives, the delivery model, and the four ways Prevent is regularly misunderstood in schools, including why a duty to have regard is not a duty to act on every worry.
- Extremism, radicalisation and terrorism. The three definitions the guidance uses, what each one does and does not include, and why using them as if they were the same word leads to bad decisions.
- Susceptibility without a checklist. Why there is no single profile and no single pathway, the three factors the guidance identifies, the specific behavioural and online trends it reports, and why non-violent extremism matters as much as violent extremism.
- What staff are not required to do. Proportionality, professional judgement and curiosity, one consistent threshold across all ideologies, the two-limb test for referring, and the guidance’s own instruction to consider whether a different kind of support or safeguarding referral would be more suitable.
- Notice, check, share. What each stage means in practice, who the check goes to, the Prevent national referral form, and what happens after a referral is made, including the gateway assessment and the frameworks the police use.
- Channel. What it is, who chairs it and who attends, the consent rules including the rules for under-18s, why it is early intervention rather than investigation, and what happens when the risk cannot be managed within it.
- Resilience and permissive environments. The curriculum expectations around the fundamental British values, the critical thinking that makes them work, filtering and monitoring, and the legal and policy checks on external speakers and events.
- Information sharing and the record that travels. Sharing as existing safeguarding practice, consent and lawful basis, and the requirement to transfer Channel information securely within the child protection file when a child leaves.
How This Course Works
This is an online, self-paced course. You can start it, pause it and return to it later, and it works on a desktop, a tablet or a phone. There is nothing that requires you to be on site, on a call or on a set schedule.
Two things to be clear about. First, it is awareness training, and it does not replace the Home Office Prevent duty training, which carries no charge and covers the referral process and the notice, check, share procedure in the form the Home Office intends it to be used. It also does not replace your setting’s own Prevent policy, or the additional training your DSL or Prevent lead is expected to have.
Second, it does not give you local thresholds, local contacts or local narratives. Those come from your setting’s policy, from your local authority Prevent lead and from the local multi-agency arrangements. If your setting has told you who your Prevent lead is and how a referral is made locally, this course will make sense of it. If it has not, ask, because that gap matters more than any awareness course.
The other courses in this range cover the areas this one deliberately touches but cannot do justice to in a single course. Safeguarding Children in Education Settings Level 1 covers the wider safeguarding framework that the Prevent duty sits inside, and Online Safety and Digital Safeguarding covers online risk in depth, which matters here because the guidance records online radicalisation as the predominant pathway for an increasing proportion of terrorism-related offenders. The full list of courses we run is on the course list page, and the education courses sit together in the education category.
Common Questions
Does this mean I have to report a pupil with extreme views?
No. What you have to do is notice, check and share in the way the guidance sets out, and the threshold for a referral is set by the guidance rather than by your discomfort. The test is whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is susceptible to being drawn into terrorism, and the assessment of that is done by specialist police officers through a gateway assessment, not by you. The guidance is also explicit that a risk-based approach should always be followed using professional judgement and curiosity, and that there should be one consistent and proportionate threshold applied across all extremist ideologies. What you should not do is report somebody because their views are unwelcome, because they attended a particular demonstration, or because they argued with you about something.
What if a pupil is not at risk of terrorism but I am worried?
Then it is probably a safeguarding referral, or pastoral support, or both, and the guidance says so. Consideration should be given to whether the person may be susceptible to radicalisation or may instead be more suitable for a different type of support or safeguarding referral. A child being groomed, exploited, bullied into an extremist group, exposed to domestic abuse or simply in crisis needs the safeguarding route, and sending them into a Prevent process instead delays the help they actually need. If you are unsure, the guidance says to seek advice from your DSL or equivalent, your local authority Prevent lead or the police in the first instance.
Does the Prevent duty mean we cannot discuss controversial topics?
It means the opposite. The guidance says the Prevent duty does not mean it should limit discussion of these issues, and that education settings should be spaces in which people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including, where appropriate, terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas. What is expected is that learners are encouraged to respect other people, with particular regard to the protected characteristics set out in the Equality Act 2010, and that schools actively promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs. A school that avoids these conversations has not reduced a risk, it has lost the opportunity to build the resilience that reduces it.
What happens to a child who is referred?
The referral is assessed by specialist police officers and staff as part of a gateway assessment. They determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect the person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism, and whether the case should go to a Channel panel. If it does, the panel is chaired by the local authority and attended by multi-agency partners, and a school or college representative may be asked to attend to help with the assessment. Channel is voluntary, so an individual must give their consent before any support is provided, and for a child under 18 consent is provided by a parent, guardian or the agency with responsibility for their care. Where the risk cannot be managed within Channel, it is kept under review by the police. And where other support is needed, the guidance says it should proceed in parallel rather than being replaced.
Is this course enough on its own?
No, and it is better to be straight about that. It covers the framework, the definitions, the referral route and the setting-level duties. It does not replace the Home Office Prevent duty training, which carries no charge and covers the notice, check, share procedure and the referral process properly, nor the additional training the Designated Safeguarding Lead or Prevent lead is expected to receive, nor your setting’s own Prevent policy, nor the induction and annual updates your setting gives to all staff. It also does not give you the local picture, which comes from your local authority Prevent lead and the local multi-agency arrangements. If you are completing this because your setting has asked you to, the sensible next step is to find out who your Prevent lead is and what your policy says.
What if a pupil is leaving and has been involved with Channel?
The guidance is explicit that when a child leaves a school or college, relevant information about engagement with Channel and the outcome of this should be securely transferred within the appropriate child protection file, which enables the new setting to have support in place in advance of a child joining. Settings should also consider whether it is appropriate to share information with the new setting in advance of a child leaving. Practically, that means the transfer has to be requested, completed and recorded before the child starts, not after somebody remembers. If you are the person holding that file, it is worth checking that this happens.
Is this course accredited?
This course is CPD-accredited and aligned to the Prevent duty guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales, published by the Home Office under section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (in force December 2023).
Care Pro Academy · Registered in the UK · Mundells, Welwyn Garden City, Hertfordshire AL7 1FT


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